Da Wei’s case for a U.S.-China détente is grounded in a real May summit and real economic arrangements. The record, however, supports a contested framework for managing rivalry — not proof that strategic competition, Taiwan friction or coercive economic measures have receded.
By Land Offset PAI, Sept. 11, 2026
WASHINGTON — A new phrase has entered the vocabulary of U.S.-China relations: “a constructive relationship of strategic stability.” It was not invented by Da Wei, the Tsinghua University scholar whose Sept. 7 Foreign Affairs essay says the two countries may have turned a corner. It came from the May summit in Beijing between President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.1
That makes the core premise of Da’s essay real, not rhetorical. The White House said the leaders agreed to pursue the framework “on the basis of fairness and reciprocity,” created trade and investment boards, and announced commercial and supply-chain commitments.2 China’s Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, said Xi described the framework as “positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay,” competition within “proper limits,” manageable differences and “expectable peace.”3
But shared words are not a shared settlement. The U.S. and Chinese descriptions attach different content to the formula, while the public record shows continuing controls, counter-controls and a Taiwan arms decision still unresolved. The available evidence supports a managed-rivalry framework, not a demonstrated détente.
Scott Kennedy, a Center for Strategic and International Studies senior adviser, made that distinction in a LinkedIn post that shared Da’s article. Kennedy called the essay “an incredibly optimistic interpretation” and argued that the terms of stability align more closely with Beijing’s preferences.4 The official records and independent analysis do not establish that Beijing has won the argument, but they do show why Kennedy’s objection deserves attention.
Da’s first major factual assertion is solid. Both governments publicly used the strategic-stability phrase after the May summit. The White House’s account emphasizes reciprocity, commercial arrangements, rare-earth supply concerns, aircraft and agricultural purchases, and forums to manage trade and investment.2 Beijing’s account also calls for political, diplomatic and military-to-military channels, but makes Taiwan the “most important issue” in the relationship and says Washington must exercise “extra caution.”3
That difference is consequential. Zongyuan Zoe Liu of the Council on Foreign Relations found that Washington presented practical deals and mechanisms, while Beijing presented a broader doctrine linking stability to China’s core interests, the three joint communiqués and limits on competition.5 Her conclusion is a useful check on both the most skeptical and most optimistic readings: the summit was neither empty theater nor a strategic settlement. It created a vocabulary and venues for management while leaving the hardest disputes intact.5
Da is also correct that Washington and Beijing took limited but real coercive actions after the summit. The Defense Department’s June notice designated Alibaba, Baidu and BYD, among other entities, as Chinese military companies under Section 1260H. The public notice gives the department’s reasons for the designations, including asserted affiliations with Chinese state institutions and military-civil-fusion contributions.6 The designation is not, by itself, a general U.S. ban on those firms; it is an annually published statutory list. Separately, restrictions adopted through the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act bar the Defense Department from entering into, renewing or extending certain direct contracts with listed firms from June 30, 2026, with indirect restrictions due later.7
China’s response was also real and explicitly framed as retaliation. On June 22, the Commerce Ministry placed 10 U.S. military-related entities on its Export Control Restricted Namelist, citing the U.S. expansion of the alleged Chinese-military-company list. Beijing said exporters could not supply dual-use items to those entities.8 Those moves demonstrate that the post-summit framework has not prevented punitive economic-security measures. They do not, on their own, prove that the framework has failed; they do undercut any claim that stability has displaced competition.
The essay is on firmer ground when it treats military communication, crisis management, citizen exchanges and reassurances over Taiwan as things the two governments could add. Neither government’s May record documents a new military crisis-management agreement, a new Taiwan understanding, or the regularized military exchanges Da recommends. 2 3 They remain proposals, not summit deliverables.
Taiwan is the sharpest test of the essay’s optimism. Da argues that Washington could recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan or explicitly oppose Taiwan independence to reassure Beijing. That is a policy recommendation, not a description of current U.S. policy. The American Institute in Taiwan says the United States follows a one-China policy guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiqués and the Six Assurances; opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side; and provides defensive articles and services so Taiwan can maintain self-defense capability.9 Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in Beijing that U.S. Taiwan policy had not changed and that any forced change in the status quo would be problematic.10
The article also attributes a pause of a $14 billion Taiwan arms package to Trump’s May meeting with Xi. The chronology is more complicated. Associated Press reporting after the summit said Trump had not decided whether to move forward and that the package could not advance until he formally sent it to Congress.11 Reuters later reported that a source familiar with the matter said sales were unrelated to the Iran war, despite earlier public comments suggesting a pause, and said Trump would decide soon.12 As of Aug. 4, the proposed $14 billion package remained under administration review and had not been formally notified to Congress, according to Focus Taiwan’s report on comments by Rep. Michael McCaul.13
The best-supported conclusion is narrower than either a declaration of détente or a prediction of imminent collapse. Washington and Beijing have established a real framework that may lower the risk of immediate escalation and create bargaining channels. At the same time, they continue to define that framework differently, retain major technology and supply-chain coercion tools, and disagree fundamentally over Taiwan. A framework for managing competition can be valuable. It is not yet evidence that competition has been transcended.
References
- Da Wei, “The Emerging U.S.-China Détente,” Foreign Affairs, Sept. 7, 2026.
- The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Deals with China, Delivering for American Workers, Farmers, and Industry,” May 17, 2026.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with U.S. President Donald J. Trump,” May 14, 2026.
- Scott Kennedy, “The Emerging U.S.-China Détente,” LinkedIn post, accessed Sept. 11, 2026.
- Zongyuan Zoe Liu, “China and the U.S. Agreed to ‘Strategic Stability’ in Beijing. They Don’t Define It the Same Way,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2026.
- Department of Defense, “Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies,” Federal Register, June 10, 2026.
- Crowell & Moring, “Navigating the 1260H List: Evolving Obligations for Government Contractors,” July 21, 2026.
- Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, “MOFCOM Spokesperson’s Remarks on Adding 10 U.S. Entities to the Export Control Restricted Namelist,” June 22, 2026.
- American Institute in Taiwan, “U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” accessed Sept. 11, 2026.
- U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State Marco Rubio With Tom Llamas of NBC News,” May 14, 2026.
- Aamer Madhani, Will Weissert and Simina Mistreanu, “Trump Weighs Taiwan Arms Package After Summit Aimed at Steadying U.S.-China Ties,” Associated Press, May 15, 2026.
- Ben Blanchard, Trevor Hunnicutt and Yimou Lee, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Unrelated to Iran War, Source Says,” Reuters, May 23, 2026.
- Sophia Yeh and Sunny Lai, “Trump to Send US$14 Billion Taiwan Arms Package to Congress: McCaul,” Focus Taiwan, Aug. 4, 2026.