By PAI
Sept. 9, 2026
Updated Sept. 10, 2026
WASHINGTON — Former Ukrainian defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov said Sept. 1 that he is building an unnamed defense-technology company and that Alex Karp, chief executive of Palantir Technologies, “will become” its first lead investor. Fedorov’s Ukrainian-language announcement called Karp the planned “first key investor.” 1 2
The announcement establishes a planned venture and a prospective investment. It does not identify a legal entity, jurisdiction, product, investment amount, valuation, equity stake, board role, voting right or closing date. CNBC reported that the investment size was not disclosed and that Fedorov’s press office declined to provide more information. 1 2 3 4
Fedorov named Karp, identified by his Palantir title. He did not say Palantir itself is investing, and the investing vehicle was not disclosed. 1 2 The reviewed announcement and contemporaneous reporting also do not establish that the venture will receive Palantir technology, Ukrainian government contracts, ministry-system access or battlefield data. 1 2 3 4
Update: Fedorov now describes three separate projects
After returning to Kyiv, Fedorov said Sept. 9 that his team had secured unspecified “resources” to create what he called the largest defense-technology venture fund in Ukraine. He also announced an analytical center intended to forecast future war scenarios and develop ways to seize the initiative. His press office told AIN.UA that the company, venture fund and analytical center are three separate projects, with additional projects to be presented later. 40 41 42 45
The statement adds scope but not transaction detail. It identifies no fund name, fund size, legal entity, domicile, committed capital, limited partners, management fee, carried interest, investment committee, conflicts policy or first closing. Fedorov said only that the fund and a further announcement about the analytical center would come “soon.” The center’s name, legal form, budget, leadership, methodology, publication policy and launch date remain undisclosed. 40 41 42 45
The “largest” description cannot be independently tested without a disclosed capitalization and a defined comparison set. AIN.UA’s 2024 market survey described D3 as a $30 million Ukraine-based defense fund and MITS as an accelerator with a $50 million target fund, while D3’s current site discloses $500,000-to-$1.5 million initial checks but no total current fund size. Those figures are historical size claims, targets and current check parameters—not a like-for-like ranking against an unnamed vehicle with no disclosed capital. 48 49
Fedorov’s Aug. 30 announcement said the proposed fund would both invest in Ukrainian defense-technology companies and create companies around battlefield needs. Before the U.S. trip, he described prospective partners and investors rather than completed commitments and said the next steps were to form a team, present a transparent fund model and launch the first projects. Reuters, summarizing a Financial Times interview, reported that Fedorov had not said whether he would benefit financially from the fund or explained his oversight role. 6 43
During the trip, Fedorov publicly described meetings with Nate Fick of Cerberus Capital Management and Guy Filippelli of Squadra Ventures. His posts characterized them as discussions about Ukraine’s defense-technology ecosystem, global market access and international capital. The reviewed announcements do not say that Fick, Cerberus, Filippelli or Squadra committed money. Karp’s publicly described prospective investment remains attached to the company, not the fund. 41 42 50
The think tank’s stated purpose also requires a narrower reading than the promotional summary. Fedorov said it would use the team’s experience to anticipate subsequent developments in the war and generate solutions proactively. In an August interview, he described a team of analysts and policymakers that would develop a vision for later stages and propose action to the government. The public record does not establish that the center will direct operations, receive government authority or gain access to classified or nonpublic battlefield data. Nor does it explain how analysis, investment selection and company formation will be separated if the three projects share personnel, information or financial interests. 40 42 45 46
The venture remains undefined
Karp said in the announcement video that Fedorov’s team could turn its knowledge of modern war into a product for allied countries. Fedorov’s team said the company would draw on its technological-warfare experience and develop defense technologies. Those statements describe an ambition, not a product plan. CNBC reported that the company’s name, planned technologies and the extent of Karp’s involvement remained unknown. 3 4
The relationship predates the announcement. At a July 16 briefing, Fedorov said Karp had called and suggested that they “do something together.” Fedorov said he replied, “Let’s talk about it later.” The account establishes prior contact, but it does not establish that the parties had executed an investment agreement. 5
Fedorov has separately outlined a proposed defense-technology investment fund that could invest in Ukrainian companies and create new ones. He associated that fund with battlefield robotics, jet-powered interceptor drones and lower-cost missiles using artificial intelligence. The reviewed sources do not assign those priorities to the unnamed company or establish a relationship between the fund and the company. 6
Fedorov also accepted a separate role advising Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto on defense innovation. Italy’s Defense Ministry confirmed the role Aug. 28, four days before the company announcement. Neither the ministry statement nor Reuters’ report links Italy to the company or Karp’s proposed investment. 7 8
The defense-technology record behind the pitch
Fedorov’s record includes an unusual state-operated link between battlefield reporting and unit-level procurement. Under Ukraine’s Army of Drones Bonus program, units upload video or photographic evidence to the DELTA battlefield-management system. After review, the unit receives ePoints that an authorized buyer can use to select eligible Ukrainian-made equipment through Brave1 Market. The Defense Procurement Agency contracts with suppliers, pays for the equipment and records delivery and acceptance through DOT-Chain Defence. 28
The Ukrainian Defense Ministry said the program recorded 819,737 video-confirmed strikes in 2025. The figure is an official system total, not an independent audit, a count of unique destroyed targets or a verified measure of Russian losses. BBC reporters observed analysts reviewing footage and distinguishing a hit from a destroyed target, but the public record does not disclose the system’s error rate, duplicate-detection method or full audit controls. 29 32
The ministry said Jan. 29 that units had ordered 240,000 drones using combat points during the first six months of the marketplace, along with an unspecified number of ground robots, components and other items. The figure measures drones ordered, not independently verified deliveries or battlefield use. The same announcement reported a 10-day average from order to receipt. A later ministry release reported a nine-day average for the broader DOT-Chain Defence marketplace as of May 26, not specifically for every ePoints order. 30 31
The program demonstrates an integrated administrative and procurement process. It does not by itself demonstrate that the points incentives improve overall battlefield effectiveness. Reporting and analysis have identified risks that quantified rewards can encourage score-chasing, repeated attacks on already-disabled targets or a preference for point-rich but tactically marginal targets. Those are credible design risks, not proof of systematic fraud. 32 33
That operating record provides context for Fedorov’s commercial pitch. It does not establish that the unnamed company will commercialize the Ukrainian system, obtain access to it or receive government data.
Fedorov’s departure from government
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy proposed Fedorov for defense minister on Jan. 2. Parliament accepted Fedorov’s resignation as first deputy prime minister and digital transformation minister Jan. 13, then appointed him defense minister Jan. 14. The Jan. 2 presidential statement was a proposal, not the appointment. 9 10 11
Parliament formally removed Fedorov from the defense post through Resolution No. 4942-IX on July 16 as a new Cabinet began work. The resolution gives no reason. Describing July 15 as the formal dismissal date would be legally imprecise. 12
NPR documented a public conflict between Fedorov and then-Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. Zelenskyy told reporters that he had sought unity between them but that “the sides did not find it.” Reuters separately reported clashes with senior generals over strategy and procurement. Those reports establish a dispute, but the primary removal act does not identify it as the legal reason for Fedorov’s departure. 13 14
Protests in Kyiv and other cities demanded Fedorov’s return and Syrskyi’s removal. Zelenskyy dismissed Syrskyi and appointed Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi through decrees dated July 22, six days after Parliament removed Fedorov. The decrees give no reason. The Associated Press reported that Zelenskyy bowed to public pressure, but that remains reported political interpretation rather than a rationale stated in the official acts. 13 15 16 17
Palantir’s Ukraine role predates the investment announcement
Palantir’s relationship with Ukraine is independently documented. Zelenskyy and then-Digital Transformation Minister Fedorov met Karp in Kyiv on June 2, 2022, to discuss defense, security and digitization. Karp said Palantir was prepared to open an office in Ukraine and work with Ukrainian specialists. 18
In February 2023, Reuters quoted Karp as saying Palantir was responsible for “most of the targeting” in Ukraine. A Palantir spokesperson said its software helped target tanks and artillery. The same report quoted Fedorov as saying Ukraine compiled information in a situational-awareness system from which its military decided a course of action. The evidence supports a role in data integration and battlefield decision support; it does not establish that Palantir independently selected targets, authorized strikes or fired weapons. 19
The relationship also included civilian and justice work. Reuters reported in April 2023 that Palantir was assisting Ukraine’s war-crimes evidence system and was not charging for that work at the time. A May 2023 government announcement said a memorandum covered defense, reconstruction, digital public services and data exchange. The same announcement said Palantir had provided software to law enforcement agencies and helped Ukrainians displaced abroad. Palantir announced a demining partnership with Ukraine’s Economy Ministry in March 2024. These records document cooperation, but they do not disclose a complete contracting or data-governance framework. 20 21 22
Defense News reported in January 2026 that the government-backed Brave1 cluster had partnered with Palantir on a secure Dataroom in which Ukrainian defense companies could train and validate artificial intelligence models using real-world intelligence on Russian aerial threats. The report said access was then restricted to Ukrainian industry because of the data’s sensitivity. 23
Karp met Zelenskyy again in Kyiv on May 12. Reuters reported Fedorov’s statement that Ukraine-Palantir cooperation included detailed airstrike analysis, processing large volumes of intelligence and integrating technology into deep-strike planning. The presidential statement described discussion of combat and civilian technology but did not disclose contracting or data-control terms. 24 25
These records make questions about data governance, vendor dependence and post-office safeguards legitimate. They do not show that Fedorov’s planned company will access any Palantir-supported environment or nonpublic Ukrainian data. The reviewed record does not disclose Ukraine-specific hosting, administrator access, retention, deletion, secondary-use, audit or model-rights terms for the Palantir-supported systems. The absence of those documents from the public record is not proof that safeguards do not exist.
The Starlink episode supports a narrower account
The LinkedIn post that prompted this report also used a late-January Starlink episode as evidence of Fedorov’s ability to solve operational technology problems. 39 The available record supports a narrower account. Fedorov said Jan. 29 that Ukraine contacted SpaceX within hours of reports that Russian drones were using Starlink connectivity. In a separate post that day, he thanked SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell and Musk for a “swift response.” Those contemporaneous statements contradict the post’s suggestion that SpaceX initially ignored Ukraine’s approach. 34 35 39
Musk said Feb. 1 that steps taken to stop unauthorized Russian use of Starlink appeared to have worked. The Atlantic later reported, citing a Ukrainian government official, that a BM-35 drone using Starlink had entered Kyiv’s government district in late January. The reviewed public record does not include a Ukrainian incident report, released wreckage analysis or SpaceX telemetry independently establishing the aircraft, terminal or exact date of that reported flight. 36 37
Fedorov said at a July briefing that Musk proposed their first video call and agreed to introduce a whitelist requiring terminals in Ukraine to be registered. The full conversation remains private, but Fedorov publicly described that operational outcome. The episode documents Fedorov’s role in coordinating a technology response; it does not establish any capability, data-access right or product belonging to his planned company. 38
What is established and what remains unverified
| Issue | Evidence status | Publication finding |
|---|---|---|
| Company plan | Established as Fedorov’s announcement | Fedorov said he is building a defense-tech company. The announcement does not identify a legal entity or show that formation is complete. 1 2 |
| Karp investment | Prospective and attributed | Fedorov said Karp “will become” the first lead investor. The announcement does not disclose an amount, vehicle, stake, governance rights or closing. 2 3 4 |
| Palantir investment | Not established | The announcement names Karp. It does not identify Palantir Technologies as the investor or transaction counterparty. 1 2 |
| Product and customers | Not disclosed | The record supports only a broad defense-technology ambition. It identifies no product, customer, contract or revenue. 3 4 |
| Government or battlefield-data access | Not established | No reviewed source gives the planned company access to ministry systems, the Brave1 Dataroom, Palantir systems or nonpublic battlefield data. 1 2 23 24 25 |
| Italian government participation | Not established | Fedorov’s advisory role is official but separate. No reviewed source links Italy to the venture or investment. 7 8 |
| Fund plan | Established as Fedorov’s announcement | Fedorov said unspecified resources had been secured for a Kyiv-based fund that would invest in existing companies and form new ones. No fund name, capital amount, legal entity or launch date was disclosed. 6 40 41 42 43 45 |
| “Largest” fund | Unverified promotional claim | Fedorov described the proposed vehicle as Ukraine’s largest defense-tech venture fund. Without a disclosed size or comparison set, the claim cannot be tested against public comparators. 40 41 42 45 48 49 |
| Analytical center | Established as a plan; structure undisclosed | Fedorov announced a separate center to forecast war scenarios, generate proposed solutions and advise government. Its entity, leadership, budget, methods, data rights and formal government relationship remain undisclosed. 40 42 45 46 |
| Fick, Cerberus, Filippelli or Squadra investment | Not established | Fedorov reported meetings about the ecosystem and capital. The reviewed public statements do not report a financial commitment by those people or firms. 41 42 50 |
| Conflict-of-interest or other wrongdoing | Not established | The reviewed record contains no finding by a competent authority that any planned investment violates Ukrainian law or involved procurement misconduct, a quid pro quo or misuse of official information. |
The public-interest test is disclosure, not accusation
Ukraine’s Law on Prevention of Corruption imposes a conditional one-year post-employment restriction. Article 26 bars a former covered official from entering specified employment or business transactions with a private entity or entrepreneur if the official exercised defined control, supervision, preparation or decision-making powers over that party during the preceding year. It also restricts the use of official information for private interests and, for one year, representation in matters where the former employing body is the opposing party. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention describes the counterparty test as fact-specific; the rule is not a blanket ban on private-sector work. Article 45 requires a declaration upon leaving office and an annual declaration the following year. 26 47
The law is not a blanket prohibition on a former minister founding a company or accepting investment. Whether Article 26 applies here depends on facts that have not been disclosed, including the transaction counterparty, the investment vehicle, whether an agreement has been executed and whether Fedorov exercised the specified powers over that counterparty. The reviewed evidence does not establish those elements or a violation.
A fuller accountability record would identify the company’s legal entity and beneficial owners; the investor and investment vehicle; the amount, instrument and closing date; any board or control rights; and any relevant declarations, recusals or conflict-management measures. It also would state whether the company or its investors can access nonpublic Ukrainian government systems or data and whether they will seek Ukrainian state contracts.
The current record supports a significant but narrow conclusion: a former defense minister says he is creating a defense-technology company, a venture fund and a war-focused analytical center. Karp is the prospective lead investor in the company. Fedorov says resources have been secured for the fund. The Sept. 9 update clarifies that these are separate projects, but it still does not establish a completed financing, the size or legal structure of the fund, a Palantir corporate investment, a data transfer, preferential government access or wrongdoing.
The next accountability threshold is documentary. The three projects should disclose their legal entities, beneficial owners, capital sources, governance and conflicts controls; the company and fund should disclose their commercial relationships and any pursuit of Ukrainian state contracts; and the analytical center should disclose its funding, data-access rules, methodology and institutional separation from investment decisions.
Source note
The Sept. 9 LinkedIn post by Defender Media was treated as a reporting lead. The underlying claims were checked against Fedorov’s original public posts, reporting that quoted his video statement and his press office’s confirmation that the company, fund and analytical center are separate projects. 40 41 42 44
The earlier LinkedIn post by Fox Hsiao was also treated as a reporting lead and was not used as evidence for the underlying claims. 39 Land Offset carried the company announcement Sept. 2 as a short item in its recurring US Defense News — Daily Digest. That item is a discovery and provenance record, not a standalone canonical report or proof of the underlying claims. 27
No contact with Fedorov, Karp, Palantir, Italian officials or Ukrainian authorities was made for this report.
AI generated from a closed, source-audited evidence record. The report distinguishes primary statements, official records, attributed reporting and unverified inferences.