Recent incidents across multiple geopolitical flashpoints indicate that interference with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) has escalated from a localized military tactic to a persistent threat affecting civilian and commercial infrastructure. This shift highlights vulnerabilities in space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems and underscores the strategic requirement for resilient, sovereign terrestrial alternatives such as eLoran.
The Expanding Scope of GNSS Interference
GNSS interference—primarily jamming and spoofing—has increasingly disrupted operations in critical maritime and aviation corridors. According to the Swedish Transport Agency, GPS disruptions over the Baltic Sea surged from 55 incidents in 2023 to 733 by August 2025, an increase that prompted joint warnings from 13 European nations and Iceland (BBC, 2025). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued a joint statement in March 2025 expressing “grave concern” over the escalation of GNSS spoofing and jamming, which disrupts the Radio Navigation Satellite Service (RNSS) frequency bands essential for civilian operations (IMO, 2025).
In the Middle East, the Israel-Iran conflict has seen similar electronic warfare deployments. During the initial days of the 2025 conflict, GPS jamming impacted the navigation systems of nearly 1,000 vessels daily in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman (Steptoe, 2025). Furthermore, Iranian electronic warfare operations successfully degraded Starlink satellite communications during the January 2026 internet blackout, achieving packet loss rates between 30% and 80% by jamming the GPS signals required by Starlink terminals to establish satellite connections (CircleID, 2026).
Vulnerabilities in Space-Based PNT
The pervasive nature of these disruptions exposes the inherent vulnerabilities of relying exclusively on space-based PNT architectures. GNSS signals are relatively weak upon reaching the Earth’s surface, making them susceptible to interference from ground-based jammers. Furthermore, low Earth orbit (LEO) constellations, often proposed as resilient alternatives, remain vulnerable to both uplink and downlink interference, as demonstrated by the disruption of commercial satellite services in the Middle East (UrsaNav, n.d.).
The Secure World Foundation’s Global Counterspace Capabilities 2026 report noted that GPS jamming over conflict zones like Ukraine has created “a giant hole” in GPS coverage for small LEO satellites that rely on onboard GPS receivers for their own positioning and timing (Inside GNSS, 2026). This indicates that the jamming environment affects the space segment itself, not just terrestrial users.
Sovereign Terrestrial Alternatives: The eLoran Imperative
To mitigate the risks associated with GNSS dependency, strategic focus is shifting toward complementary terrestrial systems. Enhanced Long-Range Navigation (eLoran) provides a high-power, low-frequency signal that is highly resistant to jamming and spoofing, and capable of penetrating buildings and subterranean environments (Steptoe, 2025).
Unlike global satellite constellations, a sovereign eLoran deployment ensures that the ground segment and communications infrastructure remain entirely under national control, minimizing reliance on foreign or commercial space-based assets (UrsaNav, n.d.).
Global powers are already implementing terrestrial PNT backups. China completed its national eLoran network in October 2024, establishing a “PNT resilience triad” comprising space-based signals, terrestrial broadcasts, and a 20,000-kilometer fiber timing network, achieving a megawatt-level Loran timing transmission accuracy of 20 nanoseconds (GPS World, 2024). Russia has maintained and upgraded its civilian LORAN-C variant, Chayka, developing it into an enhanced system known as eChayka to serve as a backup to GLONASS (Steptoe, 2025). The United States, despite the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 mandating a backup timing system for GPS, currently lacks a deployed terrestrial alternative, following the decommissioning of its legacy LORAN-C infrastructure in 2010 (RNT Foundation, 2025).
The operational continuity of critical infrastructure—including energy grids, telecommunications, financial networks, and transportation systems—depends on precise timing and positioning. The integration of resilient, sovereign terrestrial architectures like eLoran is transitioning from a contingency measure to a strategic necessity in an increasingly contested electromagnetic spectrum.
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