"Heartland for Hire": Report Alleges Missouri State University Operated Defense-Linked MBA Pipeline for Chinese Executives Over Two Decades

In late June 2026, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, chaired by Representative John Moolenaar (R-Mich.), amplified a report alleging that Missouri State University (MSU) operated a multi-decade MBA and Executive MBA (EMBA) pipeline for Chinese state-owned enterprise executives, government officials, and defense contractors. The report, titled “Heartland for Hire” and published on June 24, 2026 by the geopolitical research firm Strategy Risks, asserts that the program trained more than 1,500 Chinese personnel between 2001 and 2018, with some graduates subsequently assuming senior roles in China’s defense industry, strategic supply chains, and surveillance-technology sectors (Zhang, 2026; Kredo, 2026).


Key Parties

The following table summarizes the principal individuals and organizations at the center of the report and its public reception.

Party Role Online Presence
Rep. John Moolenaar (R-Mich.) Chairman, House Select Committee on China House.gov, X/Twitter, Facebook, Instagram
Select Committee on China Congressional oversight body House.gov, LinkedIn
Strategy Risks Geopolitical research firm; report authors strategyrisks.com, LinkedIn
Isaac Stone Fish Founder & CEO, Strategy Risks isaacstonefish.com, LinkedIn, X/Twitter
Sam Shulman Researcher, Strategy Risks LinkedIn
Missouri State University Subject of the report missouristate.edu
Gov. Mike Kehoe Governor of Missouri governor.mo.gov
Gabby Picard Communications Director, Office of Gov. Kehoe LinkedIn, X/Twitter
Jim Baker Retired MSU Vice President; established China partnerships —

The Report: “Heartland for Hire”

Strategy Risks, a New York City-based business intelligence firm founded by Isaac Stone Fish, published “Heartland for Hire” on June 24, 2026. The 28-page report was compiled by Stone Fish and researcher Sam Shulman using English- and Chinese-language records, including Chinese government recruitment notices, industry association circulars, consular records, securities disclosures, corporate biographies, and MSU board records (Strategy Risks, 2026).

Isaac Stone Fish is the author of America Second (Knopf, 2022), a book on Beijing’s influence in the United States. He is a former Beijing correspondent for Newsweek, former Asia Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine, and a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council. Stone Fish is an adjunct at New York University and a Truman National Security Project fellow (Stone Fish, n.d.).

Sam Shulman holds a master’s degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) with a focus on China and international economics, and lived in mainland China for three years and Taiwan for one year (LinkedIn, n.d.).

The full report is available via Google Drive, linked from the Strategy Risks press page at strategyrisks.com/press/report-heartland-for-hire/.


Program Origins and Structure

The MSU China programs trace their origins to 1999, when a delegation from China’s State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)—then a cabinet-level agency overseeing large state-owned enterprises—visited the United States in search of MBA programs capable of training CCP managers. Two programs were subsequently established: one at MSU in Springfield, Missouri, and one at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. Both officially launched in 2001 (Zhang, 2026).

Chinese-language government documents later described the program as a “China-U.S. state-to-state cooperation project,” according to Strategy Risks. The firm’s investigation relied on open-source research in both English and Chinese to identify participants’ government, state-owned-enterprise, defense-industry, and surveillance-sector ties. For participants linked to AVIC and other defense-related entities, Shulman stated that those affiliations existed “before, during, and after enrollment” (Zhang, 2026).

The report asserts that Chinese state and party institutions—not MSU—controlled the admissions process, establishing selection criteria and shaping the composition of each cohort. Recruiting documents from Sichuan and Shandong provinces required candidates to demonstrate political reliability, including formal CCP membership in one early notice and “a high level of ideological and political consciousness” in a 2018 notice (Zhang, 2026). Program applicants also received preferential admissions treatment from MSU, including waived English-proficiency requirements, according to the report (Man, 2026).

MSU’s own 2011 president’s blog post, authored by then-president Clifton “Clif” Smart III, described the China Programs as beginning in 1998 and noted the EMBA program began in 2007. Smart wrote that the one-year, 33-credit EMBA program was designed for students sponsored by Chinese professional associations, provincial and municipal government agencies, and universities, and that ten EMBA cohorts totaling 370 students had enrolled since 2007, generating revenue for the university (Kredo, 2026).

The CCP’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), which oversees China’s defense manufacturers, was among the Chinese state and party institutions identified as administering the program (Kredo, 2026).


Ties to the Chinese Defense Sector

The investigation identified numerous program participants who worked at or later assumed senior roles within the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), China’s largest state-owned aviation and defense conglomerate. AVIC is directly owned and controlled by SASAC. The U.S. Department of Defense has designated AVIC as a Chinese military company under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act, and the Treasury Department has listed it on the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List (The Epoch Times, 2026).

By 2015, 107 finance personnel from AVIC system entities had completed the MSU MBA program, according to the report (Miller, 2026). Specific graduates named in the report include:

  • Yu Daoyuan, who completed an MBA at MSU between 2012 and 2013 while serving as a senior manager at an AVIC subsidiary, and later became Party Secretary, Chairman, and Legal Representative for AVIC International Financial Leasing Co. (Biagini, 2026; Miller, 2026).
  • Xu Junfang, who served as chief accountant of AVIC (Chengdu) UAS Co., Ltd.—the conglomerate’s drone-manufacturing subsidiary—while also earning an MSU MBA (Biagini, 2026).
  • An executive linked to AVIC Heavy Machinery (Zhang, 2026).

According to Strategy Risks, MSU enrolled active AVIC employees in full-time MBA training in December 2019 and arranged meetings between those trainees and a delegation from Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA). NUAA is one of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defence”—a grouping of seven public universities affiliated with China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology that are widely understood to have close research partnerships with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Wikipedia, n.d.). The U.S. Commerce Department added NUAA to its Entity List in December 2020, citing national security concerns (Federal Register, 2020). As of the time of the report, NUAA continued to list MSU as a partner school for research projects including “aviation transport management” and “military and civil integration” (Kredo, 2026).

The report also identifies a 2010 MSU MBA graduate who later served as director and vice president of iFLYTEK Co., Ltd. The U.S. Commerce Department added iFLYTEK to the Entity List in October 2019 for supplying voiceprint and voice-recognition technology to Xinjiang security bureaus as part of China’s mass surveillance system targeting Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities (Federal Register, 2019; Zhang, 2026).

Additionally, the program trained a senior executive with the Jianshe Industry Group, a Chinese defense firm designated by the Pentagon as a PLA supplier (Kredo, 2026). Strategy Risks also reported that AVIC has reportedly supplied components to a subsidiary of Rostec, a Russian state-owned defense company sanctioned by the United States (Man, 2026).


Financial Arrangements and Dispute

The funding mechanisms for the program remain a point of contention. Strategy Risks cited a 2014 recruiting presentation from China Agricultural University indicating that the Chinese government covered half the program’s cost, students paid one-quarter, and a U.S. government subsidy covered the remaining quarter—implying approximately $27,000 in U.S. taxpayer support per student and a total program cost of approximately $108,000 per participant. The report estimated that total U.S. taxpayer support “was significant and may have reached tens of millions of dollars,” while acknowledging that “no public U.S. record confirms that taxpayer money was paid” (Zhang, 2026).

A separate 2014 document from China’s state-controlled chief accountants’ association stated that fees were set “in accordance with Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs standards for overseas personnel expenses and the U.S. government’s annual standards for university graduate tuition,” and that participants received “a special Missouri state government project subsidy” (Kredo, 2026). A 2018 Shandong Provincial People’s Government document, by contrast, cited a tuition cost of $32,980 with total student costs of approximately $39,800–$41,300, to be covered by the sending employer, with no mention of U.S. subsidies (Kredo, 2026).

MSU firmly rejected the claim that taxpayer funds supported the program. In a statement issued to multiple outlets, the university stated: “No taxpayer dollars were directed toward the program, as the report alleges but readily admits it cannot substantiate.” The university further noted that students studied a “conventional business curriculum” with “no evidence of espionage, intellectual property theft, misconduct, false affiliations, or complaints of harassment,” and that all admitted students complied with U.S. State Department student visa regulations (Zhang, 2026).

The report highlighted an intermediary organization referred to as IMEC, which appeared under several different names in various documents. MSU’s Office of Research Administration records disclosed that the university submitted funding requests totaling more than $18 million to IMEC between fiscal years 2007 and 2020. Strategy Risks described IMEC as a private intermediary that channeled Chinese-side program funds to MSU, but was unable to locate any corporate registration, IRS filing, or nonprofit records for any of the names IMEC used (Zhang, 2026).


Program Status and Continued Activity

Strategy Risks found evidence that MSU’s China-related infrastructure remained active in recent years. A China Programs Specialist job description revised in January 2025 stated that the position depended on sufficient revenue from the EMBA program and included responsibilities for developing and expanding EMBA partnerships with Chinese sponsors. Chinese university websites were still advertising Missouri State MBA programs for a 2024 intake as of July 2024. MSU’s partnership with Liaoning Normal University in Dalian, established with formal approval from the Chinese Ministry of Education and the MSU Board of Governors in 2000, remained in operation (Zhang, 2026; Miller, 2026).

MSU did not directly answer questions about whether the China-focused EMBA or MBA program, or any successor program, remains active (Zhang, 2026).


Congressional and Governmental Responses

Representative John Moolenaar, Chairman of the House Select Committee on China, shared the Epoch Times coverage on the committee’s LinkedIn page and issued a statement: “Missouri State’s program is another example of how China is exploiting our nation’s open society and using our academic institutions to advance its military modernization. University administrators across the country must be vigilant and only engage in open and honest educational exchanges that teach all students about the horrors of the CCP’s actions and ambitions, rather than aiding and abetting our nation’s biggest strategic competitor” (Select Committee on China, 2026).

Moolenaar has served as Chairman of the Select Committee on China since January 2025. He represents Michigan’s Second Congressional District and serves on the House Committee on Appropriations. He holds a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Hope College and a master’s degree in public administration from Harvard University. He previously served in the Michigan House of Representatives (2003–2008) and the Michigan State Senate (2011–2014) (Select Committee on China, n.d.).

The office of Missouri Governor Mike Kehoe stated it is reviewing the report. Gabby Picard, the governor’s communications director, told The Epoch Times that Kehoe does not support policies that aid the CCP in “stealing intellectual property, enhancing their national defense, disadvantaging Missouri businesses, providing intelligence on U.S. or Missouri government operations, or any other matter that provides strategic or tactical advantages, including in the public higher education system” (Zhang, 2026). The Missouri Department of Higher Education and Workforce Development referred questions to Missouri State University (Zhang, 2026).

The release of the report coincided with a June 25, 2026 hearing held by the Select Committee on China titled “China’s Economic Espionage and Subnational Influence in the United States,” held at 10:30 A.M. in Cannon House Office Building, Room 390. Witnesses included David Shedd, former Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Michael Lucci, Founder and CEO of State Armor; and John C. Yang, President and Executive Director of Asian Americans Advancing Justice (Select Committee on China, 2026).


Broader Congressional Context

The Missouri State report emerged within a broader pattern of congressional scrutiny of Chinese influence in U.S. higher education. The Select Committee on China previously launched an investigation into universities partnering with China’s China Scholarship Council (CSC), citing concerns that the program serves as a covert pipeline for Beijing to gain access to sensitive American research and technology. A September 2025 report found that American universities were educating thousands of Chinese nationals with ties to the People’s Liberation Army (McDonald & Miller, 2026).

In March 2026, Moolenaar urged the National Science Foundation to review a $67 million research security initiative over universities’ ties to Chinese military-linked institutions. In June 2026, the House Judiciary Committee passed the Protecting American Industry and Labor from International Trade Crimes Act, led by Moolenaar, which would create a Department of Justice task force to enforce trade-related crimes committed by Chinese companies (McDonald & Miller, 2026; Select Committee on China, 2026).

Strategy Risks itself had previously published a report with the Human Rights Foundation in December 2025 warning that top U.S. universities, including MIT, Stanford, Harvard, and Princeton, had partnered with Chinese AI labs tied to Beijing’s surveillance state (McDonald & Miller, 2026).


References

Biagini, W. (2026, June 24). Pipeline to the CCP: Missouri State trained executives tied to China’s military-industrial complex. Campus Reform. https://www.campusreform.org/article/pipeline-ccp-missouri-state-trained-executives-tied-chinas-military-industrial-complex/30155

Federal Register. (2019, October 9). Addition of certain entities to the Entity List. Federal Register, 84(196). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/09/2019-22210/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list

Federal Register. (2020, December 22). Addition of entities to the Entity List, revision of entry on the Entity List, and removal of entities from the Entity List. Federal Register, 85(246). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entities

Kredo, A. (2026, June 24). China is paying Missouri State U millions of dollars a year to send its best and brightest to business school, a training ground for Communist Party elites: Report. The Washington Free Beacon. https://freebeacon.com/china/china-is-paying-missouri-state-u-millions-of-dollars-a-year-to-send-its-best-and-brightest-to-business-school-a-training-ground-for-communist-party-elites-report/

Man, M. (2026, June 25). Report: Missouri State University’s decades-long MBA program for Communist elites. NTD. https://www.ntd.com/report-missouri-state-universitys-decades-long-mba-program-for-communist-elites_1154912.html

McDonald, K., & Miller, A. M. (2026, June 25). Watchdog report alleges red-state university trained executives tied to China’s defense sector. Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/watchdog-report-alleges-red-state-university-trained-executives-tied-chinas-defense-sector

Miller, F. (2026, June 25). Taxpayer dollars may have funded education of CCP assets, report reveals. The Daily Caller. https://dailycaller.com/2026/06/25/taxpayer-dollars-ccp-missouri-state-university-mba/

Select Committee on China. (2026, June). Report says Missouri State trained China’s defense executives allegedly with taxpayer support [LinkedIn post]. LinkedIn. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/select-committee-on-china-chairman-rep-john-share-7477405339710107648-awwI/

Select Committee on China. (2026, June 24). HEARING ADVISORY: China’s economic espionage and subnational influence in the United States. U.S. House of Representatives. https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/about/events/hearing-advisory-china-s-economic-espionage-and-subnational-influence-in-the-united-states

Select Committee on China. (n.d.). Chairman Moolenaar. U.S. House of Representatives. https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/about/chairman-moolenaar

Stone Fish, I. (n.d.). Bio. isaacstonefish.com. https://www.isaacstonefish.com/bio

Strategy Risks. (2026, June 24). Report: Heartland for hire. https://strategyrisks.com/press/report-heartland-for-hire/

Wikipedia. (n.d.). Seven Sons of National Defence. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Sons_of_National_Defence

Zhang, A. (2026, June 26). Report says Missouri State trained China’s defense executives allegedly with taxpayer support. The Epoch Times. https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/report-says-missouri-state-trained-chinas-defense-executives-allegedly-with-taxpayer-support-6054028


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