A June 2026 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report detailed the status of nine major U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) acquisition programs, highlighting a mix of schedule delays, cost management strategies, and oversight challenges. The report identified that while most programs controlled costs, five of the nine selected programs experienced schedule delays ranging from seven months to nearly five years (Government Accountability Office, 2026a).
Program Performance and Delays
The GAO analyzed nine of SOCOM’s costliest acquisition programs, assessing their cost, schedule, and development progress. The findings indicated that five programs faced schedule delays, while four delivered capabilities ahead of schedule.
| Program Name | Schedule Performance | Cost Performance |
|---|---|---|
| Silent Knight Radar | Early by 1 year, 8 months | Meeting goal |
| AC-130J Ghostrider | Early by 1 year, 1 month | Meeting goal |
| MH-60M Block I Upgrade | Early by 6 months | Meeting goal |
| Dry Deck Shelter Extension | Early by 6 months | Meeting goal |
| MH-47G Block II | Late by 7 months | Not meeting goal |
| Dry Combat Submersible | Late by 1 year, 7 months | Meeting goal |
| Mk 18 Mod 1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle | Late by 2 years, 5 months | Meeting goal |
| Armed Overwatch (Skyraider II) | Late by 2 years, 10 months | Meeting goal |
| SEAL Delivery Vehicle Mk 11 | Late by 4 years, 9 months | Meeting goal |
The MH-47G Block II Chinook helicopter was the only program reported to not meet its cost performance goal, alongside a seven-month delay (Government Accountability Office, 2026a). The Armed Overwatch program, which utilizes the OA-1K Skyraider II aircraft, experienced a delay of two years and ten months. SOCOM initially planned to purchase 75 Skyraider II aircraft, but resource constraints reduced the funded quantity to 53 in the proposed fiscal year 2027 budget (Schogol, 2026).
The SEAL Delivery Vehicle Mk 11 faced the most significant delay, running four years and nine months behind schedule. Program officials attributed this to deep submergence certification requirements and the need to develop tailored instructions for interfacing with the submarine fleet (Government Accountability Office, 2026b). The Dry Combat Submersible program experienced a delay of one year and seven months, primarily due to testing and delivery issues exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, though it achieved Initial Operational Capability in mid-2023 (Lockheed Martin, 2023).
Despite the delays, officials for the Armed Overwatch, Dry Combat Submersible, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Mk 11, and Mk 18 Mod 1 UUV programs stated they were on track to achieve cost goals, largely through the use of fixed-price-type contracts (Government Accountability Office, 2026b).
Oversight and Institutional Challenges
The GAO report identified significant challenges regarding the oversight capabilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). Congress strengthened the ASD(SO/LIC) role in 2016 to oversee and advocate for SOCOM acquisitions, functioning similarly to a military department secretary. However, the GAO found that ASD(SO/LIC) cannot effectively perform its acquisition-related responsibilities due to unclear protocols regarding access to program information and meetings (Government Accountability Office, 2026a).
For example, in February 2025, the SOCOM acquisition executive denied ASD(SO/LIC) officials access to a program briefing regarding a special interest program. SOCOM officials cited a change in the meeting structure, which restricted attendance to an internal audience of the acquisition executive and program executive officers (Government Accountability Office, 2026b). In another instance, ASD(SO/LIC) officials were not invited to a two-day meeting in November 2025 concerning the Armed Overwatch program, which involved SOCOM requirements division personnel and contractor officials.
Furthermore, the GAO noted inconsistent financial reporting within SOCOM. While SOCOM’s acquisition policy requires programs to report current information in an online portal, officials for eight of the nine selected programs failed to maintain up-to-date total cost estimates. This omission limits ASD(SO/LIC)'s visibility into potential cost growth risks and resource reallocation opportunities (Government Accountability Office, 2026b).
The ASD(SO/LIC) office has also experienced high turnover, with 13 individuals occupying the position since 2017. Derrick Anderson, the current ASD(SO/LIC), confirmed in December 2025, has initiated a review to establish an agreement on how the office provides oversight and advocacy for SOCOM (Government Accountability Office, 2026b). At the SOF Week 2026 convention, Anderson emphasized a vision for the SOF enterprise to “act like a service, not just service-like,” highlighting the transformation of ASD(SO/LIC) from an advisory construct into an organization with institutional authority over the SOF enterprise (Taylor, 2026).
Implementation of Leading Product Development Practices
The GAO analysis revealed that SOCOM programs experiencing delays reported less use of leading practices for iterative product development, while those delivering ahead of schedule reported higher implementation levels. Programs like the AC-130J Ghostrider and MH-60M Block I Upgrade, which met schedule and cost goals, reported full implementation of 11 and 10 out of 12 leading practices, respectively. In contrast, the four programs with the longest delays reported fully implementing only three leading practices (Government Accountability Office, 2026b).
While many programs successfully incorporated end-user feedback into their design processes, the use of digital twins was less consistent. Only the AC-130J program reported full implementation of a digital twin for systems-integrated testing. Programs also varied in their approach to developing a minimum viable product. The Armed Overwatch program, for instance, pursued airworthiness certification for a partial capability to allow for training and testing while awaiting final certification of the full system (Government Accountability Office, 2026b).
The GAO recommended that the Department of Defense ensure collaboration between ASD(SO/LIC) and SOCOM to document clear protocols for oversight, specify the frequency for updating cost estimates in the acquisition portal, and update acquisition policies to reflect leading practices for iterative product development. The Department of Defense concurred with these recommendations (Government Accountability Office, 2026a).
References
Government Accountability Office. (2026a, June 12). Special Operations Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Monitoring of Acquisitions (GAO-26-108036). https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108036
Government Accountability Office. (2026b, June). Special Operations Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Monitoring of Acquisitions (Report to Congressional Committees). https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-26-108036.pdf
Lockheed Martin. (2023, July 24). US SOCOM Declares Initial Operational Capability for Lockheed Martin’s New Dry Combat Submersible. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2023-07-24-US-SOCOM-Declares-Initial-Operational-Capability-for-Lockheed-Martins-New-Dry-Combat-Submersible
Schogol, J. (2026, May 19). Air Force now has 18 of its new Skyraider II ‘Swiss Army Knife’ aircraft, official says. Task & Purpose. Air Force now has 18 new Skyraider II 'Swiss Army Knife' aircraft
Taylor, D. (2026, May 21). USSOCOM increasingly transforming into its own service, SOF Week reveals. Military Embedded Systems. USSOCOM increasingly transforming into its own service, SOF Week reveals - Military Embedded Systems
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