Russia’s expansion of drone production and adaptation in Ukraine shows real capacity in selected systems, but public evidence also documents imported-component dependence, labor pressure and uncertain output data. 3 6 11
By PAI
Aug. 31, 2026
WASHINGTON — Russia’s defense industry has expanded output, altered its drone campaign and drawn lessons from more than 4 years of fighting in Ukraine. Those changes give Moscow a greater ability to sustain production of some lower-cost systems than was apparent early in the full-scale war. They do not, however, establish that Russia has solved its deeper problems in advanced manufacturing, skilled labor or access to foreign technology. 3 4 11
A LinkedIn post by Maria Snegovaya, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, directs readers to her Financial Times opinion article arguing that Russia is combining Soviet-era industrial capacity with drones, compact electronic warfare and other affordable systems. Samuel Bendett contributed to the article. 1 2
The central point is supported by a growing public record: Russia has localized much of the manufacture of Iranian-designed one-way attack drones, expanded facilities associated with that work and adapted designs and tactics during the war. But the available evidence requires important qualifications. Russian official figures are difficult to verify; key procurement records have become less visible; and independent assessments identify continuing dependence on foreign electronics, sanctions-related costs, workforce shortages and reliability concerns. 3 4 6 11
More money and capacity, but not a measure of effectiveness
Russia’s military expenditure reached an estimated $149 billion in 2024, a 38% real-term increase from 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The institute estimated that the spending represented 7.1% of Russia’s gross domestic product and 19% of government spending. Its measure is broader than weapons procurement: It includes personnel, operations, construction, research and development, administration, arms and equipment. Spending therefore signals the scale of mobilization but does not by itself measure usable weapons output, quality or combat performance. 5
CSIS’s July study of five Russian firms — Uralvagonzavod, Almaz-Antey, KRET, Kalashnikov and the newer drone organization Ushkuynik — found wartime pressure had reinforced consolidation around large state-backed companies while expanding production and specialized labor. The firms cover armored vehicles, air defense, electronic warfare, artillery, precision weapons and drones. The report’s assessment is deliberately narrower than a verdict on Russia’s entire military-industrial base: It concludes that Russia is likely to sustain a high production tempo in selected weapons categories and gradually rebuild reserves despite major constraints. 3
That distinction matters. A defense-industrial base is the linked network of factories, suppliers, workers, finance, research and procurement systems that produces and sustains military capability. Its performance cannot be read from a single factory expansion or a headline output figure. For its study, CSIS reviewed 78,520 deduplicated procurement contracts associated with the five entities, supplemented by satellite imagery, customs and procurement data, interviews and a workshop. The researchers also caution that Russian official and state-linked claims about production and capability gains may be inflated or selectively reported. 4
The study found physical signs consistent with expansion at Kalashnikov’s Izhevsk site, including new buildings, grading and a large warehouse and shipping structure. It separately identifies post-2022 investment at facilities linked to Almaz-Antey. Such observable construction is stronger evidence of expanded capacity than official production claims, but it does not reveal final output, component availability or equipment quality. 4
Drones have become the clearest test case
Russia’s long-range drone campaign illustrates both the scale of adaptation and its limits. One-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles, often called loitering munitions, are aircraft designed to strike a target rather than return for reuse. Iran supplied Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 systems to Russia in 2022 and began transferring production know-how soon afterward, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Russia’s domestically made Shahed-136 derivative, the Geran-2, has become a mainstay of its deep-strike campaign. 6
The IISS reported Ukrainian Air Force figures showing 2,300 one-way attack drones launched in November 2024 and 2,696 in January 2025. Satellite imagery reviewed by the institute showed the Shahed-related site in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone had at least five new buildings near its original two warehouses by April 2025. IISS also found evidence consistent with a second production line in Izhevsk, while noting that some reporting on particular variants and facilities is not independently verified. 6
The systems are changing as they scale. The Associated Press reported in June 2025 that Ukrainian specialists recovered a drone with a camera, an artificial intelligence computing platform and a radio link that could enable remote piloting. Specialists told AP that its Iranian-style labels were not conclusive proof of origin, though they were consistent with Iranian marking practices. AP also reported that most Iranian-designed attack drones were then manufactured in Russia, a change that could limit the immediate impact of interruptions to Iranian supply. 7
Other modifications appear aimed at making mass attacks more difficult and costly to defeat. IISS reported the use of Gerbera and Parodiya decoys, intended to complicate Ukrainian air defenses, alongside upgrades that include jamming-resistant antennae, alternative warheads and data links. AP reported that Russia varied altitude and attack profiles and used decoys in group attacks. In AP’s analysis of figures posted by Ukraine’s air force, the share of drones that struck an identifiable target rose from about 6% in November 2024 to about 16% in June 2025. Ukraine’s Defense Ministry told AP that larger volleys, decoys, technical changes and tactics all likely contributed. 6 7
The available record does not support treating every reported advance as fielded at scale. AP reported that Ukraine recovered two jet-powered Shaheds in May 2025, but that they did not appear to have been widely adopted. IISS similarly said Ukrainian military intelligence’s claim that Russia was establishing a jet-powered Shahed production line had not been independently verified. IISS also found that attempts to cut costs by replacing higher-quality Western components with cheaper Chinese equivalents could reduce reliability. 6 7
Electronic warfare is part of the same contest. The term refers to the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, disrupt or protect communications, navigation and sensors. Radio links, satellite navigation and drone-control signals can all be targets. The evidence shows Russian effort to improve resilience against jamming and to alter drone control, but it does not allow a reliable public accounting of every compact jammer or counter-drone system delivered to Russian units. 2 4 7
Adaptation still relies on foreign supply networks
Russia’s ability to produce drones does not mean it has become self-sufficient. In October 2024, the Treasury Department said IEMZ Kupol, an Almaz-Antey subsidiary, coordinated production of the Garpiya long-range attack drone at factories in China with Russian defense firms. Treasury said the network used Chinese-made engines and imported electronic and mechanical components with drone applications. The department’s sanctions action targeted the companies and an individual it said supported the program. 8
A broader Treasury action in June 2024 described Russian procurement of machine tools, industrial machinery and microelectronics through networks reaching beyond Russia. It identified Russian firms producing or importing printed circuit boards, batteries, composites and navigation-module components used in unmanned aircraft. The European Union’s 17th sanctions package, adopted in May 2025, added restrictions on more entities providing drones, weapons, components and logistics to the Russian military and tightened controls on 31 entities tied to its military-industrial complex, including some in third countries involved in export-control circumvention. 9 10
Those measures document networks and risks, not a complete inventory of every imported part or an assurance that sanctions will halt production. Their persistence underscores a more precise conclusion: Russia’s wartime adaptation combines domestic assembly, legacy industrial infrastructure and foreign inputs. The resulting supply chain can be resilient through substitution and intermediaries while remaining vulnerable to cost increases, disruption and technological limitations. 8 9 10
Constraints set the boundary of the buildup
Chatham House concluded in July 2025 that Russia retained the industrial and scientific base to prosecute the war in Ukraine but struggled to make genuinely new, technologically advanced systems. Its assessment cites reliance on legacy systems and third-party suppliers, as well as labor and workforce deficiencies, industrial concentration, financial strains, corruption and quality-control problems. The institute judged that Russia could continue to field systems adequate to sustain a threat while falling behind longer-term Western and Chinese technological advances. 11
CSIS reaches a compatible, though not identical, assessment. It identifies labor shortages, corruption, imported-component dependence and higher acquisition costs under sanctions as enduring constraints. It also notes a major transparency problem: A 2022 Russian government decree allowed redaction of defense-adjacent procurement records, producing what the authors call a visibility cliff in publicly available data. That makes claims of precise, sectorwide output especially difficult to independently confirm. 3 4
The implication for readers and planners is not that cheap systems replace all high-end military capabilities. Rather, drones and electronic warfare have altered the economics of pressure on air defenses, logistics and communications. Russia’s advantage in this area is less a claim of universal technological superiority than an ability to assemble, modify and expend certain systems in large numbers while drawing feedback from active combat. Ukraine is adapting in the same environment, including through electronic warfare, mobile firing teams and specialized interceptor drones. 6 7
NATO’s updated Defense Production Action Plan reflects the allied concern that production capacity, demand signals and adoption speed have become strategic variables. Endorsed in February 2025, the plan calls for aggregated demand, long-term investment, multiyear multinational procurement, visibility into surge capacity, interoperability and standardization. The U.S. Defense Department’s industrial strategy implementation plan similarly describes a need for a more resilient industrial ecosystem that requires coordination among government, industry and allies. 12 13
Russia’s wartime industrial shift should therefore be assessed as an uneven transformation rather than a return to Soviet mass production or a finished high-technology modernization. The best-supported evidence is in observable factory expansion, recurring drone launches, localized production and evolving tactics. The unanswered questions — sustainable access to components, the quality of mass output, labor capacity and the effect of sanctions and battlefield losses — are at least as consequential to its future military power. 3 4 6 11