The evolving landscape of naval warfare has brought renewed attention to the strategic importance of mine warfare, particularly in the context of denying adversaries safe harbor. In a recent essay titled “There Can Be No Sanctuary,” published in the July 2026 issue of Proceedings by the U.S. Naval Institute, Commander Jordan Spector of the U.S. Navy argues that shallow-water mining could fundamentally disrupt maritime power projection by denying adversaries the protected harbors where their forces mass, sustain, and prepare (Spector, 2026). The essay, which won first prize in the Naval Mine Warfare Essay Contest sponsored by the Mine Warfare Association, highlights the necessity of evolving mine warfare doctrine from sea area denial to sea sanctuary denial.
The concept of sea sanctuary denial is driven by the increasing capabilities of unmanned systems, which blur the lines between traditional mines, long-range strikes, and loitering torpedoes. For instance, in December 2025, Ukraine successfully utilized a long-range unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) to strike an improved Kilo-class submarine in the Russian harbor of Novorossiysk (Spector, 2026). This operation forced Russia to install protective barriers, restricting port operations and degrading fleet combat power. Such systems, including Iran’s loitering torpedoes and Anduril’s Copperhead-M torpedoes, offer extended endurance and customizable strike parameters, allowing nations to choose how, when, and what to strike.
Traditional mine warfare has typically focused on blue-water locations, choke points, and transit routes. While effective in restricting freedom of maneuver, these operations often encounter adversary forces that are already massed and prepared (Spector, 2026). In contrast, sanctuaries enable combat power preparation, making them critical targets. However, conventional targeting of these shallow coastal waters faces challenges such as geography, anti-access/area-denial networks, and hardening. To address these challenges, an integrated approach is required, utilizing air-launched mines for rapid deployment, submarine-launched systems for stealth, large unmanned systems like the Orca extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV) for shallow access, and naval special warfare for last-mile access.
The strategic implications of sea sanctuary denial are significant, particularly when facing numerically superior fleets, such as China’s Navy. Allowing adversaries full use of their fleets could make repelling an invasion highly challenging (Spector, 2026). While sea sanctuary denial is inherently aggressive and escalatory, it may prove necessary to match adversary escalation or provide an asymmetric advantage. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy must also prepare to defend its own high-value targets, such as Pearl Harbor and Norfolk, against similar capabilities through a layered defense approach involving diver detection systems, counter-UUV patrols, and physical hardening.
The renewed focus on mine warfare is evident in the U.S. Navy’s investments in modern systems like the Quickstrike-ER mines and Hammerhead mine systems, as well as the return of mine warfare exercises (Spector, 2026). As highlighted by J.A. Spector on LinkedIn, the integration of traditional sea area denial and sanctuary denial remains a critical area for development, offering an opportunity to leverage existing platforms and operators for enhanced maritime security.
References
Spector, J. (2026, July). There can be no sanctuary. Proceedings, 152(7). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/july/there-can-be-no-sanctuary
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