The PLA’s Assessment of U.S. Marine Corps Stand-In Forces: Vulnerabilities and Strategic Responses
In recent years, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increasingly focused its strategic calculus on the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) evolving operational concepts, particularly the “Stand-In Forces” (SIF) initiative. A recent translation by the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) provides a rare, internal PLA perspective on how Chinese military strategists view the SIF concept not merely as a tactical shift, but as a lens through which to identify and address the PLA’s own operational vulnerabilities in the near seas (Sharman, 2026; Zhiqiang et al., 2026).
The Strategic Context of Stand-In Forces
The USMC’s Stand-In Forces concept, officially articulated in December 2021 as part of the broader Force Design 2030 transformation, emphasizes the deployment of small, lethal, low-signature, and highly mobile units within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ) (Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC], 2021). The primary objective of SIF is to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, and sea-denial operations, thereby disrupting adversary plans and winning the all-domain counter-reconnaissance battle (Carter, 2024). By operating forward alongside allies and partners, these forces aim to maintain persistent presence and deter aggression below the threshold of armed conflict (HQMC, 2021).
PLA Vulnerabilities Identified Through the SIF Lens
According to CMSI Translation #32, authored by PLA strategists Yue Zhiqiang, Wang Li, and Li Jinqiao and published on July 6, 2026, the USMC’s SIF concept exposes several pressing operational vulnerabilities for the PLA, particularly concerning operations within the first island chain (Zhiqiang et al., 2026). The authors argue that the U.S. strategy highlights critical gaps in the PLA’s current capabilities. First, the PLA faces significant challenges in detecting and tracking low-signature manned and unmanned systems operating near strategic targets, such as islands, coastal installations, or PLAN formations. Second, PLA information networks are vulnerable to saturation by unmanned platforms equipped with electronic warfare payloads. Third, there are perceived shortcomings in reconnaissance, early warning, and overall maritime domain awareness across the air, surface, and undersea domains. Fourth, the PLA struggles to effectively counter distributed, unmanned, and other low-cost maritime capabilities. Fifth, ensuring maritime superiority against persistent, forward-deployed U.S. forces operating within China’s defensive perimeter remains a significant challenge (Zhiqiang et al., 2026).
Proposed PLA Countermeasures
To mitigate these vulnerabilities and counter the continuous penetration into China’s near seas, the PLA authors recommend a proactive and multifaceted response (Zhiqiang et al., 2026). These recommendations align with broader PLA modernization goals, including the transition toward a “Far Seas Protection” strategy (Rice & Robb, 2021).
| Recommended Action | Strategic Objective |
|---|---|
| Forward Posture | Adopt a more proactive forward operational posture beyond China’s coastline by deploying combat forces forward |
| Non-Kinetic Expansion | Expand offensive cyber, electronic warfare, and other non-kinetic capabilities to counter U.S. technological advantages |
| Sensor Integration | Better integrate military, government, and civilian sensors to strengthen all-domain early warning systems |
| Unmanned Systems | Accelerate development of unmanned underwater, surface, and aerial systems alongside undersea pre-positioned weapon systems |
| Networked Command | Build integrated maritime network information systems to improve command and control and manned-unmanned teaming |
The recommendation to accelerate unmanned systems development is consistent with the U.S. Department of Defense’s (2024) assessment that China is advancing a “comprehensive” unmanned aerial vehicle modernization effort approaching U.S. standards, and is actively experimenting with unmanned surface and undersea vehicles (Department of Defense [DoD], 2024).
The Role of the China Maritime Studies Institute
The insights into the PLA’s strategic thinking are made accessible through the work of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College. Established in 2006, CMSI enables scholars to perform academic research from Chinese-language sources to develop deeper insight into key aspects of China’s maritime development, capabilities, and trends (U.S. Naval War College [USNWC], n.d.). CMSI publishes multiple series of research products, including the Translations series, China Maritime Reports, CMSI Notes, and Red Books, all freely accessible to the public (USNWC, n.d.).
Christopher H. Sharman, a retired U.S. Navy Captain with over 30 years of service, has directed CMSI since November 2023 (Sharman, n.d.). His career includes service as Assistant Navy Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing (2009–2012), Navy Attaché in Hanoi (2016–2019), and Senior Strategist at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2020–2023) (Sharman, n.d.). He is a prolific author, Congressional witness, and sought-after analyst on China’s naval ambitions and Taiwan Strait dynamics (Sharman, n.d.).
CMSI Translation #32 was made possible through the meticulous translation work of CMSI affiliate Natalie S., who rendered the original Chinese-language article into English, enabling broader access to PLA strategic thinking for the research community (Sharman, 2026).
References
Carter, J. (2024, January 8). Strategic competition and stand-in forces. Marine Corps Gazette. Strategic Competition and Stand-in Forces - Marine Corps Association
Department of Defense. (2024, December 18). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2024.pdf
Headquarters Marine Corps. (2021, December 1). A concept for stand-in forces. https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Users/183/35/4535/211201_A%20Concept%20for%20Stand-In%20Forces.pdf
Rice, J., & Robb, E. (2021, February). China Maritime Report No. 13: The origins of “Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection.” China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=cmsi-maritime-reports
Sharman, C. H. (2026, July 6). [LinkedIn post on CMSI Translation #32]. LinkedIn. #cmsi #prc #pla #plan #china #badpanda | Christopher Sharman
Sharman, C. H. (n.d.). Christopher H. Sharman: Curriculum vitae. U.S. Naval War College. https://usnwc.edu/_images/portals/0/FacultyMembers/Sharman-Christopher/Sharman_CV.pdf
U.S. Naval War College. (n.d.). China Maritime Studies Institute. China Maritime Studies Institute | U.S. Naval War College
Zhiqiang, Y., Li, W., & Jinqiao, L. (2026, July 6). CMSI Translations #32: The U.S. Marine Corps concept for “Stand-In Forces”—Analysis and response. CMSI Translations. China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College. "CMSI Translations #32: The U.S. Marine Corps Concept for “Stand-In For" by Yue Zhiqiang, Wang Li et al.
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